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CHAPTER 7

Limits to the Law:
Challenging the Health Services
Restructuring Commission in Court*
Joan M. Gilmour

INTRODUCTION
A key element in Wellesley Central Hospital>s Staying Alive campaign was its
legal challenge to the Health Services Restructuring Commission's (HSRC)
Directions, requiring it to transfer its programs and services to St. Michael's
Hospital and cease operations. This chapter describes those legal proceedings,
and analyzes them in the larger context of the restructuring process the
government instituted. Part I explains the legal background underlying the
litigation. It outlines the basis for and extent of government control over
hospitals in Ontario, and the legal constraints on it when undertaking hospital
restructuring, especially hospital closure. This part explains how the legislation
governing both public hospitals and the Ministry of Health was amended by the
Conservative government shortly after it assumed power in the mid- l 990s, to
remove many of those constraints and expand government's power to
reconfigure the public hospital system. At the same time, it eliminated ways that
government could be held accountable by transferring responsibility for making
changes to a newly created body, the Health Services Restructuring Commission.
Parts II and III review and assess the outcome of the government's approach,
and the attempts by hospitals and citizens to contest it in court. Part II focuses
on the HSRC's Directions to the Wellesley Central and the lawsuit the hospital
launched in response. Part III reviews other hospitals' legal challenges to the
HSRC and their results. Part IV analyzes the role of the courts, and reflects
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more generally on the utility of the litigation strategies adopted by Wellesl
Central and other hospitals in their attempts to alter the government's cour;>'
given the legal framework and political climate in which the restructurine,
process took place.
g

PART I: HOSPITALS, RESTRUCTURING AN D THE LAW
Although hospitals in Ontario are for the most part non-profit institutions
rather than government-operated facilities, nonetheless, government provides
the bulk of their funding, and they are subject to extensive government
regulation. Even though hospitals' share of the health care dollar has been
shrinking for several years, hospitals remain the largest single item of health care
spending in Canada. As a result, when governments seek to constrain health
care costs, the hospital sector is an obvious target. In doing so, however,
governments must abide by the law-the common law, statutes and regulations
that govern not only hospitals, but government itself. Legal frameworks limit
the changes that can be made and how they can be implemented. In the field
of health care, government has traditionally been accorded significant leeway
in policy-making. Decisions about the overall shape of the publicly funded
health care system-what level of funding will be provided to hospitals, what
types of services will be insured, and so on-have generally been considered to
be policy decisions properly made by government, at least at a macro level.
Once these policies and funding decisions have been set, the many institutions
and providers in the system then work to provide care within the government's
framework and in keeping with their own policies.
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing to the mid-1990s, the
government's primary means of attempting to constrain hospital costs in
Ontario was to cut hospital budgets. For the most part, decisions to do so were
considered to be beyond the supervisory power of the courts. For example,
in Re Metropolitan General Hospital and the Minister of Health ( 1979), the
application for judicial review seeking to compel the Minister of Health to
remedy a claimed emergency situation at a Windsor hospital and reinstate 25
beds and the attendant funding fo r them, failed. Although the evidence
established that the hospital was below the Ministry's own target of beds-topopulation ratio in the area, the court held that, provided the Minister was
acting in accordance with his duties, departmental expenditures were within
his discretion. Under the Ministry ofHealth Act, the Minister's duties included
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hospitals and assessing the revenues required for that purpose. The
~tatute directed the Minister to determine the hospital facilities required to
eet the public's health needs, and to promote the development of adequate
11
eaJth resources. Nonetheless, the court held that the Minister was not required
1
:o spend money allocated to his department in a particular way or at all, nor
1id he owe the applicant hospital a legal duty to do so. The court concluded
chat "the wisdom of the decision can never be the subject of judicial review. It
is a political and not a judicial problem" (Re Metropolitan General Hospital
!ltld the Minister of Health, 1979, at 705).
It would seem to follow from such an expansive view of government's
discretion that decisions about hospital restructuring would be largely
unassailable in court, essentially giving the Minister of Health a free hand to reshape the system. Ministerial power, however, is not unlimited. Courts exercise
a supervisory role through judicial review to ensure that even at the ministerial
level, government acts according to law. In this way, judicial review can serve
as an important constraint on government action. Even Ministers are not
permitted to exceed their jurisdiction, act in unauthorized and procedurally
unfair ways or contravene constitutional rights. These constraints have limited
government's power over public hospitals in important ways. In Re Doctors
Hospital and the Minister ofHealth (l 976), the court upheld a challenge to the
Cabinet's decision to close Doctors Hospital in Toronto and others by revoking
their approval under the Public Hospitals Act. The government had decided to
close these hospitals in order to save money. The court held that, having regard
to the history and content of the Act, it was regulatory in nature and meant
to deal only with managerial, staffing and operational matters. Consequently,
it was not sufficiently broad to allow government to close hospitals for financial
reasons or budgetary constraints. These were extraneous considerations when
government acted under this statute, and it had no jurisdiction to take them into
account. Consequently, its decision was void. The court's interpretation of the
purpose and policy underlying the Public Hospitals Act meant that government
could not rely on it to close hospitals for financial reasons. In the result, whi1e
government could cut hospitals' funding, it was very difficult to force a hospital
to close, at least by executive order.
The landscape for hospital planning and restructuring changed abruptly
when the Conservatives were elected in Ontario in 1995, promising a «common
Sense Revolution" that would shrink the role of government, reduce government
expenditures and financial commitments and lower taxes. In January 1996,
the Conservative government swiftly passed and proclaimed in force the Savings
, 0 veming
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and Restructuring Act, 1996 (the «SRA"), omnibus legislation that br
sweeping change to many areas, including the governance of the hea}~Ugbt
system. A striking feature common to many of these changes was the elimina~
of traditional ways to hold government accoun table. In particular, the
limited o~ den~ed access to the courts to challenge government actions, oft.RA
by removing nghts of appeal. As John Evans (now Mr. Justice Evans) en
· commentmg
· on th.is leg1s
· lanon,
·
by ms
· ul atmg
· the exercise
· of governnoted
m
· fl uence o f concerned c1t1zens,
··
o ntano
· was introduc·
lllent
power fr om th e m
"government by management-style command and increasing the provin lrl,g
democratic deficit" (Evans, Canada Watch, 1996, at 65).
ce 5
The SRA significantly augmented the government's ability to reconfisure
the public hospital system, and to do so for a greatly expanded variety of
reasons. It amended the Public Hospitals Act (PHA) to give the Minister of
Health broad powers to direct changes in the operations of public hospitals,
including the ability to require hospitals to close, amalgamate, or alter the type,
level and volume of services provided, if the Minister considered it in the public
interest to do so (PHA, s.6). A broad definition of «public interest,, was also
added to the statute-essentially, it encompassed any m atter the Minister
regarded as relevant, including the "proper management of the health care
system in general" and "the availability of financial resources" to manage the
system and deliver services (PHA, s.9). Companion amendments to the Ministry
ofHealth Act (MHA) allowed Cabinet to create the Health Services Restructuring
Commission (HSRC) fo r a limited term and assign it d uties and powers in
connection with the development and restructuring of the health care system
(MH A, s.8). In March 1996, th e M inister's newly expanded powers over
hospitals were delegated to the HSRC by regulation (0.Reg. 87/96, made under
the PHA; O.Reg. 88/96, made under the MHA). Ontario already had some
experience with health planning bodies prior to the SRA: District health
councils had been established, with regional planning and advisory
responsibilities. Delegation of responsibility to them had, however, been
limited; they were seen as primarily advisory, and subject to significant Ministry
direction and control (Fierlbeck, 2001 , 147). Unlike the district health councils,
the HSRC could requ ire change. There was no appeal from its decisions to a
court or any other body. The Comm ission was given four years, until March
2000, to complete its work.
The HSRC was delegated extensive powers to restructure public hospitals,
but received little direction from the Ministry about what the health care system
should look like or what level of services would be appropriate, other than 1

:on
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uirement that it have regard to district health council reports for affected
re<l rnunities (MHA, s.8(8) ). 1 The Commission characterized its task as

(001

threefold (HSRC, 2000, p. 11):

1. To make binding decisions about hospital restructuring;
2. To make recommendations about the restructuring of other sectors
of the health system, including reinvestment needed in hospitals and
elsewhere; and

3. To foster the creation of an integrated health services system.
Despite the broad grant of power, it was still subject to legal and practical
liJTlits. While hospitals were required to implement its restructuring decisions,
it bad only advisory power with respect to other elements in the health services
~ystem. Further, authority over funding remained with the Ministry of Health.
\nd finally, the SRA did not exclude the possibility of judicial review (although
as it turned out, with only one exception, courts rejected all substantive
challenges to its decisions).
In its final report on its activities, the HSRC asserts that from the outset,
Commission members believed that in order to develop a truly effective
health services system, restructuring should begin with primary care and
, 0 mmunity services systems rather than with hospitals, the «institutions of
last resort,, (HSRC, 2000, p. 13). In contrast, from the government's point of
view, the Commission's "prime mandate,, was hospital restructuring. Despite
members' views about what would be required to achieve genuine reform,
they accepted their appointments and proceeded with the government's
3genda (ibid.).
The HSRC insisted throughout that it had not been charged with cutting
costs (HSRC, 2000, p. 1). As even it acknowledged, however, the government's
announcement in December 1995 that hospital budgets would be reduced by
18 percent over the coming three years did lead to "cynicism about restructuring
and create the strong perception that the HSRC was simply an agent of the
government mandated to 'manage, hospital budget reductions,, (HSRC, 2000,
p. 12) . That perception was understandable. Not only was the government
lashing hospital budgets from the outset of the hospital restructuring process,
but the HSRC itself was created pursuant to a statute, the SRA, the full title of
which was: An Act to Achieve Fiscal Savings and to promote Economic Prosperity

tlirough Public Sector Restructuring, Streamlining and Efficiency and to implement
1
' ther aspects of the government's economic agenda (S.O. 1996, c.l). There is not
ime word in the lengthy title of that statute about improving the health care
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system or anything else, except finances. The focus was economics and th
explicit aim was saving money.
e
The government was keenly aware that cutting costs in the health care S}'Stern
especially by closing hospitals, would provoke strong opposition and eXa '
heavy political costs. Hospitals are intricately intertwined with the communiti~
in which they are situated, and fill a host of important roles. Rather than take
on hospital restructuring directly, then, the government set out to shift decision
making to the newly created HSRC, expecting that in this way, it could absolve
itself of responsibility for these decisions and distance itself from the blame and
criticism that were sure to follow (Cohn, 2001) . The HSRC and those involved
in its operations clearly recognized that it was meant to be a political buffer. In
reporting at the conclusion of its term, it noted that among the government
and hospital staff, Commission members and staff, and others whom it had
canvassed about its operations, the «resounding response" was that «the Health
Services Restructuring Commission did a job that could not have been done
by the MOHLTC [Ministry of Health and Long Term Care), the Government
of Ontario, or the hospital community, individually or collectively." One
respondent added that the greatest risk to continued restructuring was
«government's inability to make the tough decisions" (HSRC, 2000, pp. 161-62).
The government>s approach to hospital restructuring was to try to depoliticize
decision making about health care services by removing it from the realm of
political contestation. One crucial element it used in advancing this agenda was
to shield the restructuring process from legal scrutiny or challenge (see generally
Gilmour, 2002, pp. 286-92). Examining the legal proceedings in the Wellesley
Central and other challenges to the HSRC's decisions will provide a basis on
which to assess the government's efforts.

PART II: WELLESLEY CENTRAL HOSPITAL IN COURT

i) Wellesley Central Hospital and the He alth Services Restructuring
Commission's Directions
Despite the lack of ground rules or guidelines, the HSRC began work as soon as
the regulations were in place and appointments to the Commission were finalized
in April 1996. It adopted three highly generalized evaluative criteria to guide
the restructuring process: quality> accessibility, and affordability (HSRC> 2000,
pp. 16-18). The terms were appealingly «common sense," but were obviously
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open to wide1y varying interpretations and emphases. Still, who could object
these as goals for the hospital system? The devil, of course, was in the details,
10
and in what the criteria, admirable as they appeared, left out.
The Commission began its review of Metropolitan Toronto hospitals a few
months into its mandate, in June 1996. Previously, the Metropolitan Toronto
District Health Council had recommended in its final report on hospital
restructuring in Toronto, released in September 1995, that services be
consolidated in fewer locations and significantly curtailed at The Wellesley
j-{ospital.2 It had not, however, recommended doing away with a role for the
hospital entirely, nor changing its ownership (Wellesley Central Hospital v.
Ontario (H.S.R.C.), hereafter "Wellesley," para. 11). Following release of that
report and in an effort to forestall its implementation, Wellesley had voluntarily
amalgan1ated with the Central Hospital to create the Wellesley Central Hospital
Corporation, and then entered into an alliance with Women's College Hospital
(the "alliance") that the partners projected would realize savings of $51 million
annually (Wellesley, para. 12).
The HSRC released its initial report on hospital restructuring in
Metropolitan Toronto on March 6, 1997. It included Notices of Intention to
Issue Directions to a number of area hospitals, including Wellesley Central. It
proposed to require Welles]ey Central and St. Michael's Hospital to develop
and implement a plan whereby Wellesley Central would relinquish the
ownership, operation, management and control of its programs, services,
buildings and assets to St. Michael's by August 31, 1997. Wellesley Central
was to cease operation as a public hospital (HSRC, 2000, p. 112). The HSRC's
Notice of Intention to Issue Directions to Wellesley's alliance partner, Women's
College Hospital, would require it to amalgamate with Sunnybrook Health
Sciences Centre and the Orthopaedic and Arthritic Hospital. The bulk of
programs and services were to be provided at the Sunnybrook site, although
ambulatory women's health care programs would be retained in downtown
Toronto. Prior to the issuance of the Notices, Wellesley Central had understood
from its meetings with Commission staff that the HSRC viewed the new
initiative it had undertaken with Women's College in forming the alliance
favourably-indeed, that the two should "go as far and as fast as you can" to
implement it (Burnham Affidavit). When the Notices of Intention to Issue
Directions were released, however, the HSRC gave no effect to the alliance at
all. The Commission allowed the hospitals affected by these Noti ces the
minimum 30 days required by Jaw in which to respond (PHA, s.6 (5))-that
is, until April 7, 1997.
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ii) Wellesley Central Hospital v. Ontario (Health Services
Restructuring Commission): The Litigation
Although the SRA and the regulations delegating power to the HSRC had not
included any provision for appeal from its decisions, the Wellesley Central
Board of Directors was determined to fight the Directions in court. To that
end, by late March 1997, it had changed the hospitars legal representation and
retained a new law firm, Fasken Martineau, with instructions to mount the
strongest legal case that would protect the hospital and its assets, and that
would also establish what would be lost if the hospital was closed. The latter Point
was especially important to Wellesley Central, given that it was implicit in the
HSRC's intended Directions that it considered the two hospitals to be essentially
interchangeable in terms of their ability to offer services - i.e., that St. Michael's,
a Roman Catholic institution, could simply step into Wellesley Central's shoes,
despite the particular characteristics and needs of the population Wellesley
Central served, and the nature of the care and programs it provided. At the
same time, given the short deadlines the Commission had imposed for responses,
Wellesley Central also had to take every opportunity to make its case within the
HSRC' s processes and try to convince the Commission that the hospital should
remain open. Even after requesting an extension of time in which to respond
from the HSRC, it was only given a few more weeks, first until April 18 and then
until May 2, 1997 (Wellesley, para. 13). Its lawyers scrambled to prepare
submissions to the Commission as well as the case to be argued in court, and
at the same time, advise the hospital and its directors about the myriad legal
issues raised by both the legal challenge and the HSRC's Directions if, in the end,
they had to be implemented (personal communication, Robert Cosman, Fasken
Martineau, July 2003). Consideration had to be given to employment issues,
directors' duties, insurance, expenditures, confidentiality of patient records,
ownership of Wellesley Central's land and buildings, the legality of the Directions
requiring the transfer of assets and other matters. Time was short, and the
hospital had to act on multiple fronts simultaneously.
Wellesley Central was not the only hospital that had decided to contest the
HSRC's Directions in court. Several hospitals in Toronto and elsewhere in the
province faced the prospect of being shut down or having their services severely
curtailed. Losing institutions that not only ministered to a community's health
needs, but were also embedded in its social and economic life understandably
aroused strong and heated opposition. While the HSRC's Directions could
not be appealed, the legislation and regulations did not preclude judicial review.
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The Legal Team:
TWCH Board of Diredors engaged in legal action in the summer of 199 7 to set aside the hospital's
closure. The key legal arguments focused on expropriation of the hospital's assets, the possibility of
bias on the part of decision-makers and the violation of rights of individuals under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Pidured above, Fasken Martineau lawyers, Bob Cosman and Kelly
McKinnon, prepare for the court case. (Source: Wellesley Central Health Corporation, Archives.)

With their very existence at stake, mounting a legal challenge seemed to be
one of the few avenues remaining open to hospitals that had the potential to
force the HSRC to back down. Sudbury General Hospital, the Brockville,
London and Lakehead Psychiatric Hospitals, and Pembroke Civic Hospital
had already begun proceedings seeking judicial review of the Commission,s
Directions.3 In Toronto, Wellesley Central, as well as Women,s College Hospital
(Wellesley>s alliance partner) and the Doctors Hospital commenced applications
for judicial review, while others considered doing so too.
Wellesley presented its submissions to the HSRC objecting to its proposed
Directions at the beginning of May 1997. It also filed its application for judicial
review, seeking to prevent the Commission from implementing themspecifically, it sought an order quashing the Notice oflntention and prohibiting
the Commission from issuing Directions in the same or similar terms. The
HSRC responded with a motion to quash the application for judicial review on
the ground that it was premature, since the Commission had not made any
final decision yet The two motions were argued before the Divisional Court on
June 25, 1997. The court allowed the HSRC,s motion and dismissed Wellesley
Central's application for judicial review as premature ([1997] O.J. No. 2752).
In its judgment, it noted that the Commission's procedures allowed those
affected by the Notices to respond, and that such submissions might influence
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its final decisions. Experience with the HSRC's processes was still limited
that point, and the tenacity with which it would adhere to the plans it announc:
in its Notices of Intention was not yet apparent. In light of this, it is perha
understandable that the court characterized the Notice oflntention to Wellest s
Central as "essentially an invitation to concerned persons to carry on a dialogu;
with the Commission; the Notice was no more than the Commission's "present
inclination" (ibid., para. 3). Although it did not grant the relief the hospital
sought, the court did note that Wellesley Central had serious concerns about
the Commission's jurisdiction, composition and procedures, adding that it
could raise these with the Commission, and if it still objected after the
Commission finalized its decisions, in court (ibid., para. 4).
The HSRC issued its final Directions to Metropolitan Toronto hospitals and
Advice to the Minister of Health one month later, on July 23, 1997 (HSRC,
"Metropolitan Toronto Health Services Restructuring Report"). The broad
outlines of its Directions to Wellesley Central remained unchanged-it was
to relinquish the operation and management of its programs and services to St
Michael's Hospital. The HSRC had, however, taken account of the argument
made by counsel for Wellesley Central and some of the other hospitals that, in
the absence of statutory authorization, requiring them to transfer ownership
of hospital buildings and assets constituted unlawful expropriation. The final
HSRC Directions required Wellesley Central to develop a plan with St Michael's
to transfer the operation and management of its services and programs, but it
no longer had to relinquish its buildings and assets to St. Michael's. It did,
however, still have to allow temporary use of its premises by St. Michael's as
needed for patient care, education and research (with payment of appropriate
compensation). The two hospitals were also directed to develop a plan (i) for
a new Sherbourne Hospital Corporation to establish, own and govern an
ambulatory care centre at the Central Hospital site; and (ii) to provide for the
transfer of ownership of the buildings and assets at the Central site to the new
corporation (with compensation). The Wellesley Central Board was also directed
to make recommendations to the Minister of Health for the disposal of the
hospital's land, buildings and assets at the Wellesley Street site once all programs
had been transferred.
Two days after the HSRC issued its final Directions for Metropolitan
Toronto, on July 25, 1997, the Divisional Court released its judgment in Pembroke

Civic Hospital v. Ontario (Health Services Restructuring Commission). This was
the first case to address challenges to the HSRC 1s processes, composition,
mandate and powers on substantive grounds. Earlier challenges to HSRC
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processes and jurisdiction had been disposed of on procedural grounds. 4
pernbroke Civic Hospital, located in Renfrew County north of Ottawa, had
sought judicial review of Directions the HSRC had issued in February 1997,
requiring it to close and transfer its programs and services to the Pembroke
General Hospital, a Roman Catholic institution in the same town.
The court dismissed the Civic's application and upheld the decision of the
ttSRC. In what became a recurring theme in these cases, Mr. Justice Archie
carnpbell stressed the restricted role of the court in reviewing decisions of
the Commission:
The court's role is very limited in these cases. The court has no power to
inquire into the rights and wrongs of hospital restructuring laws or policies,
the wisdom or folly of decisions to close particular hospitals, or decisions to
direct particular hospital governance structures. It is not for the court to
agree or disagree with the decision of the Commission. The law provides no
right of appeal from the Commission to the court. The court has no power
to review the merits of the Commission's decisions. The only role of the
court is to decide whether the Commission acted according to law in arriving at its decision. (Pembroke Civic Hospital, 1997, p. 44)

The court rejected all the Civic's arguments-that it had been denied procedural
fairness by the HSRC because of bias, prejudgment or failure to provide adequate
opportunity to make submissions; that the Commission had erred in accepting
a continuing role for denominational governance in the health care system;
and that residents' rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
to freedom of religion and conscience, to equality, and to life, liberty and
security of the person had been infringed by the Commission's selection of a
Roman Catholic hospital over the secular Civic as the only public hospital
remaining in the community. The Civic immediately sought leave to appeal
from this decision and a stay of the court's order until the appeal could be
beard, since otherwise, the HSRC Directions would require its emergency
department to close almost immediately. The Civic was granted a stay pending
determination of the application for leave to appeal, but the application for
leave itself was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on September 10, 1997 ( [ 1997]
O.J. No 3603). The decision in Pembroke Civic proved highly influential on
later courts in the legal challenges to the HSRC that followed.
Within a week of the release of the HSRC,s final Directions for Metropolitan
Toronto, on July 31, 1997, Wellesley Central and three individuals who relied

364

I

SURVIVAL STRATEGIES

on the hospital for health care commenced an application for judicial
.
review
It sought to quash the Directions on the grounds that
·
1. The Commission did not have the authority to compel a public
hospital to divest itself of its assets or otherwise interfere with its
property rights;
2. The Directions were void for uncertainty;
3. The Commission exercised its discretion unreasonably by taking into
account or according excessive weight to an irrelevant consideration
namely, the interest of a Catholic health care provider in not having,
its religious governance diluted;
4. The Commission violated its duty of procedural fairness;
5. The Commission was inappropriately influenced by the government;
6. Past associations of Commission members and staff gave rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias; and
7. The Directions violated rights guaranteed under the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms to (i) freedom of religion, (ii) equality
and (iii) liberty and security of the person.
Women's College Hospital (Wellesleys erstwhile alliance partner) and Doctors
Hospital also brought applications for judicial review. Time was of the essence, since
the HSRC required hospitals to implement its Directions in short order.
Arrangements were quickly finalized with the court and counsel for all parties in
these cases to hear the applications (and potentially, one by the Orthopaedic and
Arthritic Hospital) during the week of August 25, 1997. In early August 1997,
Wellesley Central and the HSRC consented to a motion by St. Michael,s Hospital
seeking leave to intervene on specified grounds in the Wellesley Central proceedings.
Wellesley Central's application for judicial review was heard August 27 and
28, 1997, immediately following that brought by Doctors Hospital. W omen's
College had reached an agreement with Sunnybrook and the Orthopaedic and
Arthritic Hospital, and did not p roceed with its application. In judgments
released September 15, 1997, the Divisional Court dismissed both Wellesley
Central's and Doctors, applications with costs, upholding the HSRC's Directions.
Wellesley Central's counsel drafted the documents required to seek leave to
appeal this decision, which argued that the court had erred in concluding the
HSRC had not unlawfully expropriated Wellesley Central's property. Since
negotiations with St. Michael's, and then with the government> did progress,
however, it did not proceed with that application.
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from the outset, Wellesley>s counsel had considered one of its strongest
arguments to be that the Directions affecting Wellesley,s assets and property were
in reality an unlawful expropriation (taking of its property) (personal
communication, Robert Cosman, July, 2003). The HSRC had directed Wellesley
Central to develop a plan with St. Michael's Hospital to (i) allow the latter
temporary use of some of its facilities while needed for patient care, research
and education; and (ii) transfer ownership of its buildings and assets, as well
as programs and services at the Central Hospital site to St. Michael's and the
new Sherboume Hospital Corporation; further, the Wellesley Central Board had
been directed to (iii) make recommendations to the Minister of Health to
dispose of the land, buildings and assets at the Wellesley site. The common
Jaw is clear that the power to expropriate must be specifically conferred by
statute. Adopting the reasoning in the companion Doctors Hospital case, the
court held, however, that since use of the Wellesley site was only temporary, and
was needed in order to transfer programs and services (something the HSRC
was authorized by statute to require), then the Direction was merely ancillary
to the HSRC's power under the Public Hospitals Act to «make any other direction
related to a hospital that the Minister considers in the public interest,, (PHA
s.6(6)), and thus did not contravene the law (Wellesley, para. 21; Doctors
Hospital, 1997, para. 33). It concluded that the Direction regarding the Central
Hospital site only ordered the parties to negotiate toward a particular goal.
This, too, was unobjectionable, because merely anticipating agreement was
not expropriation. It added that if the parties were not able to agree, "the
matter may then require legislation, a regulation under [the PHA] or the use
of the court to adjudicate on the then o utstanding issues,, (Wellesley, para.
24). Thus, the court acknowledged that in the event of deadlock, neither the
HSRC nor the Minister would necessarily be able to require implementation
of the HSRC's plans for the Central site without further authorization. Finally,
with respect to the Direction that the Wellesley Central Board formulate and
recommend a plan to dispose of the property at the Wellesley site, the court
concluded that because the HSRC had not actually directed the hospital to
dispose of the land, and it had not done so yet (not surprisingly, since Wellesley
was challenging the legality of this Direction in court), this could not be said
to constitute an expropriation either (Wellesley, para. 25). The Divisional
Court's reasoning in Wellesley Central and Doctors Hospital is marked by a
formalistic reading of both the common law on expropriation and the practical
effect of the HSRC's Directions. It coupled this with a large and liberal reading
of the HSRC's statutory power, to support its conclusion that requiring these
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hospitals ~o make arra~g~ment to dispose of and transfer their property di
not constitute expropnahon.
d
Wellesley Central also argued that the HSRC had ordered it to transfer
and programs rather than merge or amalgamate with St. Michael)s be~
the Commission had acceded to Roman Catholic health care providers' dernan~
for continued denominational control of their governance structures despit
restructuring, and in so doing, had given excessive weight to private sectaria~
interests. The Divisional Court rejected this argument too. Relying on Pembroke
Civic Hospital, it noted that it was for the Commission to decide whether to take
the role of Roman Catholic hospitals in Ontario into account, and whether to
consider representations from them. It concluded that there was no evidence
the HSRC had given the private interests of Roman Catholic health care undue
weight to preserve the purity of St. Michael's governance structure (Wellesley,
para. 36). Evidence of pronouncements by the Catholic Health Association of
Ontario that denominational control of governance structures was a "deal
breaker,, was not enough to convince the court otherwise (Wellesley, para. 33).
As in Pembroke Civic, the court characterized the Commission's role, powers
and functions as close to the political/legislative rather than judicial end of the
spectrum, meaning that it had the widest area of non-reviewable discretion.
It rejected Wellesley's arguments that Commission members' past associations
with health care and other organizations gave rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias. The court considered it an advantage and indeed, in the public interest,
that as a "policy making and implementation body," its members be experienced
and knowledgeable people. Nor had the Commission denied Wellesley Central
procedural fairness in not adopting more adversarial procedures, given the
nature of its task; Wellesley had been given sufficient opportunity to state its
case and knew the case it had to meet (Wellesley, paras. 40, 43).
The court's unwillingness to engage in any close review of the Commission's
decisions extended to arguments that its Directions breached the Canadian
Charter ofRights and Freedoms as well. Again, it relied heavily on the analysis
in Pembroke Civic. In both cases, secular hospitals had been directed to transfer
programs and services to Roman Catholic institutions and to cease operations
themselves. Relative to Wellesley Central, one effect of the HSRC Directions
would be to eliminate access to a number of reproductive health care services
previously available at the Wellesley when programs were transferred to St.
Michael's. Physicians granted privileges at St. Michael's were required to sign
an acknowledgement of their willingness to abide by the principles in the
Catholic Health Care Ethics Guide.5 Abortions, vasectomies, tubal ligation as
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form of birth control, birth control counselling, artificial insemination and
~ .,;tro fertilization involving unmarried persons were among the services that
1n
would no longer be offered (Wellesley, para. 60). Wellesley Central had served
a high-needs, low-income population, with a high incidence of gay and lesbian
patients and patients infected with HIV/AIDS. Wellesley and the individual
applicants objected to programs and services being transferred to an institution
that adhered to the moral precepts of the Roman Catholic Church, which
condemns homosexuality and prohibits a range of reproductive and other
services. As the court noted, "the Catholic health care mission, which is a
guiding principle of CHAO members [Catholic Health Association, which
included St. Michael's] encompasses the Catechism of the Catholic Church ....
The catechism presents homosexual acts as 'immoral,' 'evil,' 'depraved,' and
'disordered"' (Wellesley, para. 60).
Wellesley Central and the individual applicants argued that the result of the
HSRC's Directions would be to violate patients' rights to freedom of conscience
and religion, to equality and to security of the person, all protected under the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They asserted that the right to freedom of
religion includes a right to be free from religion, that the right to security of the
person includes the right to be free from the threat to security that would result
from the increased difficulty that women in Wellesley's catchment area would
have in accessing reproductive services (in particular, abortion), and that the
individual applicants, equality rights would be breached because they would have
to obtain health care services in a hostile climate that would reasonably be
perceived as discriminatory (Wellesley, paras. 61, 62).
The Charter challenges all failed, primarily because in the court's view,
women and those personal applicants who were gay, lesbian or HIV+ had
other options-they would not be compelled to receive treatment at St.
Michael's. The court did not even call on the HSRC or St. Michael,s to respond
on the Charter issues (Wellesley, para. 63). Nowhere does the court-or the
HSRC, whose decision it was reviewing-explicitly consider the implications
of a public hospital deciding not to offer certain reproductive health care
services, not on the basis of resource availability, but rather as the result of a
moral judgment that those services (which are for the most part publicly insured
and therefore by definition medically necessary) are wrong. The court adopted
the reasoning in Pembroke Civic, in which Archie Campbell J. concluded: "The
silent presence of crucifixes does not constrain the chosen religious practices
of those exposed to them and does not compel or coerce them to engage in
religious practices or observances which they would not freely choose,,
VI
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(Pembroke, para. 56).That observation does not, however, address the
the Charter claims being advanced. The Charter claims in Wellesley
of
and Pembroke Civic were about access to health care and the conditions entrqJ

;;ux

which that would occur, not about patients being compelled to ''en :nd~
8
religious observances." As I have argued elsewhere (Gilmour, 2002 280 8: 111
,

u-o9):

The institutional policies dictated by adherence to the Catholic fai th are in
themselves coercive, because they prohibit the provision of certain types of
health care on the basis that a particular religion condemns them as morally
wrong. They carry with them an inherent judgment, the judgment of a publicly funded institution charged with carrying out government policy to provide comprehensive health care, that those seeking such services--primarily
women-are also morally in the wrong, or at best misguided. That is not a
silent presence but an active judgment with real consequences and ramifications, particularly when other hospitals and health care are not easily
accessed, either because of geography or owing to lack of individual resources
or institutional capacity.

These policies restrict decisions about patients' health care to those dictated by
religious belief, rather than encompassing the range appropriate to the health
needs of the person concerned. The restrictions are exacerbated if accompanied
by limitations on ready referrals and comprehensive, open counselling.
The court in Wellesley Central accepted the HSRC's argument that Toronto's
large size meant that access would not be affected. When cross-examined on
his affidavit filed on behalf of the HSRC in the Wellesley Central proceedings,
Mark Rochon, CEO of the HSRC, stated that the Commission had considered
accessibility of services, and that in addition to Wellesley Central and St.
Michaet>s, it had directed the Toronto Hospital and Mt. Sinai Hospital to
determine which of the Wellesley's services should be relocated there. He added
that the services at issue were already available in other Toronto hospitals, and
that in any event, many could be provided outside the hospital setting in
doctors' offices or clinics. 6 As for people living with HIV/AIDS, th e HSRC
concluded and the court accepted that they, too, could obtain health services
elsewhere in Toronto (Wellesley, paras. 64-66). Since there was no compulsion,
the court held that the Charter-protected right to freedom of conscience and
religion would not be breached (Wellesley, 729).
The HSRC's assertion (echoed in the litigation by the intervenor, St Michael's
Hospital) that services eliminated at the Wellesley could simply be accessed
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ewhere merits closer examination. With respect to reproductive services,
els prior to the hospital restructuring process, research had indicated that
~::;ite the Supreme Court of Canada,s 1988 decision in R. v. Morgentaler,
es.s to abortion was limited and controversial in many areas (Ferris et al., 1998;
~~c s). Indeed, in t~e Pembroke C.ivic litigation, the. Pembroke
obstetrician/gynaecologist whose affi.daVlt the Roman Catholic Pembroke
General filed as part of its case had stated on cross-examination that, although
abortions were performed at the Ottawa Civic Hospital, there was too little
operating room time available, and as a result, most women in Pembroke
needing abortions went to the Morgentaler clinic in Montreal. 7 Montreal is
more than 300 kilometres from Pembroke.
In issuing its Directions to Toronto hospitals, the HSRC does not seem to have
concerned itselfwith the effects its decisions would have on women,s access to these
services, although both their contentious nature and still fragile presence in the
health care system were well known. There is no indication the HSRC took existing
research into account or made its own assessment in this regard, beyond noting
that there were facilities in Toronto performing abortions, and calling for the
establishment of a Women's Health Council. Nor is there an indication in its
reports that it actually made a determination on evidence that other facilities
could or would replace the services lost. Yet in a 1994 survey of Ontario hospitals
performing abortions, providers noted limits on ability to book operating room
time, lack of availability of beds and too few physicians with appropriate training
as factors limiting hospitals' capacity (Ferris, 1998). These findings make the
HSRC's assumption that hospitals and clinics that had been performing abortions
would simply be able to absorb the demand that had been met at the Wellesley
questionable. It was not at all clear that other facilities would or could do so, or
whether this would increase delay in accessing these services.
Mr. Justice Adams had commented some years earlier in Ontario (A.G.)

9

v. Dieleman:
Public hospitals have not always given priority to the interests of women
seeking access to abortion services .... The need for free-standing clinics in
Ontario is pronounced because of the politics which pervade the abortion
issue and the impact of political forces on hospitals throughout the
province.... In effect, the free-standing clinics are a response to the uncertain
delivery of abortion services at Ontario's public hospitals notwithstanding
that hospitals provide the greatest protection against the harmful effects of
protest activity." (1994, pp. 315-16)
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Ensuring women's ability to access abortion services has remained a stru
both in the courts, given some provincial governments' refusal to all ggle,
ow or
fund this type of care (see e.g., Morgentaler, 1993; Lexogest, 1993; Morgental
1995; Jane Doe, 2004), and in the less obviously political realm oflocal hospi~:
decisions. When abortion access is considered as a matter of health ca
administration, then denials of access are characterized as local governan:e
issues; the gendered nature and discriminatory effects of those decisions ar:
obscured (Gilmour, 2002; Lessard, 1997).
From the beginning, although courts took a limited view of their role th
recognized that they still had to determine "whether the Commission ~ct:~
according to the law in arriving at its decision" (Pembroke, p. 44). Yet in every
challenge to the HSRC except one, courts were decidedly deferential in doing
so. They repeatedly resisted efforts to have them delve into the bases for the
HSRC's decisions or query them closely. Administrative law scholar David
Mullan has sumn1arized the experience in the HSRC litigation: ccthe
opportunities left open by the concept of 'act[ing] according to the law'
proved ... to be quite limited" (Mullan, 1999, p. 353). That was certainly true
in Wellesley Central. The court's broad reading of the Commission's policymaking function and the scope of its discretion led it to decline to scrutinize
the relevance or weight of factors the Commission took into account, such as
the role and impact of denominational governance, or consider the significance
of matters it omitted.

PART Ill: OTHER LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE HEALTH
SERVICES RESTRUCTURING COMMISSION
There were few legal challenges to the HSRC after those from Toronto. With
one exception, all of them met the same fate as Wellesley Central's.

i) Russell v. Ontario (Health Services Restructuring Commission)
(1998)
In Russell v. Ontario (Health Services Restructuring Commission), decided in
1998, the Divisional Court was faced with the reverse situation to that in
Wellesley Central. The HSRC had directed the Roman Catholic Hotel Dieu
Hospital in Kingston to cease operating as a public hospital and relinquish
operation and management of its programs and services to the secular Kingston
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:;eneral Hospital (KGH), with provision for temporary use of the Hotel Dieu
Juildings and assets by KGH for patient care. The Directions also called for
:he establishment of an ambulatory care centre at the site of the Kingston
psychiatric Hospital (a move dependent on both Ministerial approval and
?Janning permission), and required KGH to offer the religious order that
:>perated the Hotel Dieu the opportunity to manage both the new ambulatory
:are centre and the transitional services at the Hotel Dieu site--in other words,
3 continuing role in acute health care (Russell, 1998, para. 3). Prior to the HSRC
process, area hospitals had already voluntarily engaged in a process of
rationalizing services, so that even before the Commission issued its Directions,
Hotel Dieu had limited its services to ambulatory care with limited walk-in
emergency services and acute inpatient mental health beds. Most inpatient
acute care services and all rehabilitation care had been consolidated elsewhere
(Russel~ 1998, para. 6). HotelDieu and the individual members of the religious
order that operated it asserted that the Directions infringed their Charterprotected right to religious freedom, which they argued included the ability
to continue the mission of their order, ministering to the sick poor. They also
argued that the Directions were patently unreasonable and premature, since the
hospital would have to dose before either the planning authority or the ministry
could decide whether the psychiatric hospital site would be approved for
ambulatory care, and that the HSRC had failed to take relevant planning
considerations into account.
In a decision affirmed on appeal, the court rejected all these arguments
(Russell, Ont. C.A., 1999). Relying on Wellesley Central, it noted that if the
HSRC had to resolve implementation issues before issuing Directions, it would
never make any progress at all. It added that the HSRC was not required
to consider matters beyond its mandate, such as planning considerations,
although it was free to do so. 8 As it pointed out, if the necessary planning and
ministerial approvals were not forthcoming, the HSRC could amend or revise
its Directions.
The Divisional Court disposed of the applicants' Charter arguments by
noting that, since there was no constitutional entitlement to funding for
denominational hospitals in the first place, there was no constitutional
impediment to withdrawing funding. The religious order was still free to
continue its mission to minister to the sick poor in other ways, but "[n]ever
... has it been suggested that freedom of religion entitles one to state support
for one's religion.,,9
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ii) Douglas Memorial Hospital v. Ontario (Health Services

Restructuring Commission) (1999)

f1
pl

o·
The reluctance to intervene in the HSRC,s decisions is also apparent in Dou

Memorial Hospital v. Ontario (Health Services Restructuring Commissionf5

decision of the Superior Court dismissing the hospital's application for judic~
review. The HSRC issued its Restructuring Report for the Niagara Region and
Directions to the nine area hospitals, including the applicant, in March 1999
Douglas Memorial Hospital, a rural public hospital located in Fort Erie, wa.s
directed to amalgamate with the eight other hospitals in the region to fonn the
Niagara Health Care System. The affected hospitals would lose their independent
governance, although standing committees for each of the rural communities
affected would have limited power to refuse approval of decisions to eliminate
local inpatient or emergency services. The governance structure that the HSRC
directed these hospitals to adopt differed from Ministry of Health policy, set
out in a framework and guidelines for rural and northern health care that it
had developed in 1997. Douglas Memorial, concerned that it would be absorbed
by the larger hospitals, challenged the Directions on two grounds: First, that the
HSRC was bound by the Ministry's framework (under which rural hospitals
were to be left to determine their own governance arrangements); and second,
that the Directions were discriminatory because they did not treat it in the same
way as other rural hospitals that had not been the subject ofHSRC Directions.
The court would not consider the merits of the HSRC's decision. In dismissing
the application, Hambly J. stated, "the governance structure recommended by
the Commission may or may not be in the public interest. The Commission, after
far greater deliberation than I am able to give the matter and with far greater
knowledge of the issues than I have, decided that it is,, (para. 17). Even though
the Ministry had developed policy to guide the Commission in its work in this
sector, the court held that its framework and guidelines were not binding on
the HSRC. Provided the Commission had exercised its mandate in good faith,
its decisions about restructuring in the Niagara Region, and at Douglas Memorial
in particular, could not be considered discriminatory (para. 25).
The government was caught by its own decision to create an independent
commission to restructure hospitals. When it tried to impose a solution that
would be more acceptable to rural and northern areas (where it relied on strong
political support), it found that it could not do so. As the decision in Douglas
Memorial demonstrated, its commission was not required to follow its orders.
That situation was, however, short-lived. Within a month of the release of the
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sRC's Niagara area report in March 1999, the government put regulations in
ace revoking the HSRC,s decision-making powers and making its role advisory
~ly (0. Regs. 272/99 and 273/99).

i) Lalonde v. Ontario (Health Services Restructuring Commission)
,999)

mly one hospital successfully challenged the HSRC,s Directions. In February
997, the Commission released its initial Ottawa Health Services Restructuring
eport and Notices of Intention to issue Directions to public hospitals in the
Jrtawa area. It proposed to direct Hopital Montfort to dose as a public hospital
nd amalgamate with three other hospitals in the area to form a single corporation
roviding services at two sites. Montfort was a francophone institution, providing
ealth care services to the public and training for medical professionals in
rench. As such) it filled an important role both practically and symbolically in
1e Franco-Ontarian community in the region and beyond. The threat of
losure generated tremendous public protest from the commwlity, as well as from
~eral, Quebec and some Ontario politicians. In August 1997, the Commission
econsidered its original plan and issued a second report, with revised Directions
) the Montfort. It concluded the hospital should remain open and retain its own
overnance, but that it would become primarily a centre for ambulatory care,
fith a reduced budget and number of beds that would support limited day
urgery, limited obstetrics and acute and longer term mental health beds (Lalonde,
999, para. 30). The revised Directions also included provisions to strengthen
he bilingual nature of services offered at other area institutions being
econfigured. Montfort and the francophone community were of the view that
he modified Directions would destroy the francophone nature of services and
raining. The hospital and inclividual applicants sought judicial review to have
he Directions quashed and to prevent their re-introduction.
Montfort asserted:
1. The Directions violated the Charter,s guarantee of equality rights by
discriminating against Franco-Ontarians.
2. The Commission violated administrative law principles in issuing the
Directions, as (i) they were patently unreasonable, and (ii) the
Commission bad exceeded its jurisdiction by taking irrelevant
considerations into account (specifically, the possibility of an
anglophone backlash).
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3. The Directions failed to effectively protect the francoph one minority
one of the country's founding cultures, and therefore violated a
,
fundamental organizing principle underlying the Canadian
constitution, the protection of minorities.
As noted previously, in April 1999 the government had revoked the Cornmission's authority to issue Directions to public hospitals in place of the Minister
and made its role advisory only (0. Regs. 272/99 and 273/99). The Divisional
Court heard the Montfort's application for judicial review in Jun e 1999, and
released its decision in November of that year (Lalonde v. Ontario (Health
Services Restructuring Commission, 1999).
The court quashed the Commission's Directions. It held that by focusing on
restructuring hospital services without taking into account the Montfort's
broader institutional role in promoting and enhancing Franco-Ontarians as a
cultural/linguistic minority, the HSRC had violated the unwritten constitutional
principle requiring that minorities be respected and protected. 10 The HSRC,
in keeping with provincial policy, had focused on the bilingual provision of
services. In doing so, the court concluded, it had ignored Montfort's broader
institutional role, and had not considered the need for unilingual francophone
institutions. The decision was affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
December 2001(Lalonde,2002). It h eld that the Commission's Directions were
inconsistent with the purpose and objectives of Ontario's French Language
Services Act (FLSA), which had been put in place to enhance the equality and use
of French. The HSRC had failed to take all reasonable measures to comply with
that statute (Lalonde, 2002, paras. 164-65). Further, in determining the public
interest, as the Commission was required to do in restructuring the hospital
system under the PHA, it must have regard to the fundamental constitutional
principle of respect for and protection of minorities (Lalonde, 2002, para. 180).
It had not done so. Justifications based on "administrative convenience and
vague funding concerns" did not suffice to displace these statutory and
constitutional imperatives (Lalonde, 2002, para. 168). The court remitted the
question of restru cturing health services at the Montfort to the Minister for
reconsideration in light of its conclusions. 11 Under intense political pressure, the
government decided not to seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Lalonde stands in striking contrast to the other legal challenges to the HSRC.
Unlike Russell, in which the court left the HSRC to decide for itself whether
to consider matters not central to its mandate (in that case, the Planning Act and
planning considerations raised by its restructuring p lan fo r Kingston area
hospitals), in Lalonde, the court circumscribed the Commission's p ower to
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nterpret its mandate. It held that the unwritten constitutional principle requiring
·espect for and protection of minorities imposed a substantive legal obligation
>D the HSRC to advance the protection of francophone minorities in
·0 nnulating its Directions. This was reinforced by the FLSA. Unlike the Planning
i\ct, the HSRC was not free to ignore this statute. Since it had failed to take
!ither into account, its Directions could not stand.
Other than Lalonde, courts had refused to examine the merits of HSRC
Directions or question its processes. The tone was set from the outset in
Pembroke Civic: The HSRC had the widest area of non-reviewable decision
making. Its decisions were allowed to stand even when they contravened the
goverrunenfs own policy (as in Douglas Memorial), or presumed on the approval
of other, unrelated government authorities (as in Russell). Only in Lalonde was
the court prepared to hold that the Commission had not "acted according to
law," and then only when it failed to adhere to a constitutional principle, the
protection of minorities. Once that threshold had been crossed, however, the
court did not hesitate to scrutinize the evidence, substitute its own assessment
of the facts (in particular, what the effect oflosing the Montfort as a unilingual
health care and training facility would be, and the inadequacy of the HSRC's
bilingual alternative) and pointedly outline the solution it had concluded was
needed, a unilingual facility at least as strong as currently existed.
Both levels of court in Lalonde obviously considered it to be a different
kind of case than the others, justifying a more interventionist approach and a
higher level of scrutiny. Presumably, this was because it raised questions of
constitutional rights. Deference to the Commission was neither required nor
appropriate on issues of constitutional interpretation. Applicants had, however,
raised constitutional claims in other cases, including Wellesley Central, and
they had lost. In those cases, courts had declined to inquire into the HSRC's factgathering or decision-making processes, leaving its exercise of discretion
untouched, even when deciding Charter claims. Perhaps taken aback by the
magnitude and seemingly intractable nature of soaring health care costs, or
reluctant to interfere with the government's policy agenda, courts in those
cases had held that because any constitutional violations were only prospective,
applicants had to meet a high threshold of proof and show substantial evidence
of the anticipated Charter violations (Wellesley, 1997, para. 67; Gilmour, 2002,
291). When coupled with courts' refusal to scrutinize the evidence the HSRC
had taken into account or query its assertions that its restructuring plans best
met its criteria of quality, accessibility and affordability of health care services,
these Charter challenges had little chance of success.
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PART IV: REFLECTIONS ON THE HOSPITAL
RESTRUCTURING PROCESS
In reflecting on the restructuring process in general, it is clear that the co
were not prepared to stand in the way of government's determination tornUrts
ahead with its policy agenda decisively and quickly. For the most part, t~ve
treated the restructuring decisions as outside their area of expertise. As t~
Divisional Court noted in rejecting Montfort's administrative law clairns i e
Lalonde, "The Commission's decisions are fundamentally matters ofjudgernen~
... reasonable people can differ on the solutions" (Lalonde, 1999, para. 9?).
Both the Commission and the courts treated restructuring as a technical matter
with decisions left to administrators and experts charged with the theoretically
neutral task of rationalizing the public hospital system (Gilmour, 2002, p. 291).
The result was essentially unchallengeable HSRC decisions.
Characterizing the HSRC Directions in this way ignored their qualitative
dimensions and obscured their political character. With the exception of
Lalonde, the HSRC successfully concentrated the courts' (and its own) attention
on the technical aspects of the hospital restructuring decisions in Wellesley
Central and the other decisions. The courts, for their part, gave short shrift to
arguments about the systemic effects that HSRC decisions would have on the
care particular groups would receive. In Wellesley Central, the patient groups
who would be disproportionately affected by the decision to close the hospital
were not powerful people. They were poor people, people with HIVI AIDS,
women, and gays and lesbians. These groups' Charter claims had so little
purchase with the court that it did not even call on the respondents to address
those issues (Wellesley, 1997, para. 63). Unlike the Catholic Health Association
of Ontario (which, as Mark Rochon, CEO of the HSRC, pointed out when
cross-examined on his affidavit in the Pembroke Civic proceedings, was consulted
because it spends in excess of one billion dollars a year of public funds, and
so, is a very significant presence in the hospital system), 12 members of these
groups are frequently marginalized, and are seldom decision-makers when it
comes to the health services available to them. Instead, they are most often the
objects of solutions that have been developed by experts in the policy-making
process and then applied to them. In contrast, the constitutional claim based
on linguistic/c ultural rights carried the day in Lalonde, and the court imposed
a remedy that substantially narrowed the policy choices open to government
in restructuring this hospital, all but directing the outcome.
By creating the HSRC and delegating to it the power to make decisions
)
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bout closing public hospitals and transferring services, the government aimed
J insulate itself from poHtical and legal accountability. As Daniel Cohn has
1
:inted out, however, it is difficult for government to depoliticize tough
~estructuring issues or deflect blame from itself when it not only sets the
Co~rnission's mandate and the length of its term, and appoints its members,
but also retains the power to change all of that by regulation (Cohn, 2001).
AS discussed previously, the HSRC saw itself as essential to pushing through
difficult but necessary decisions (HSRC, 2000). Despite the numerous speeches
and presentations HSRC members and staff gave and the countless meetings
they held, however, it never attained popular legitimacy. Given its task, that
may have been an impossible goal. The public remained sceptical about its
priority-setting process and hostile to many of its Directions. The public was
not convinced that its decisions were the necessary result of an objective,
technical assessment, conducted by an independent body applying its expertise
to difficult issues. The extent of public opposition was remarked on by the
courts in several of the challenges to the Commission's Directions (see, for
example, Pembroke and Lalonde), and was evident in the public campaigns for
change to them, such as Wellesley Central's Staying Alive, and that mounted
by the Friends of Women's College Hospital. Indeed, the government itself
was unconvinced by the HSRC, and would not follow the expert advice of its
own Commission when it came to northern and rural restructuring (HSRC,
2000, p. 81)! Hospital restructuring could not be reduced to a matter of technical
expertise, without also factoring in qualitative considerations and the many
other crucial characteristics of the hospitals' place in the community and the
health care system. In the end, government's strategy to offload decision making
to the HSRC did not shelter it from blame or the political fallout from hospital
restructuring. It was unable to distance itself from responsibility for the decisions
that "its,, Commission made.
As for the hospitals, in hindsight, did litigating make sense? With the exception
of the Montfort, all of them lost in court. Litigation takes tremendous resources
-not just money, but time and energy as well. Hospitals, though, were faced with
closure or a substantial reduction in the services they could provide. While the
costs of litigation were high, so were the stakes-hospitals were fighting for
their very existence. Even though the legislation and regulations had been drafted
to shield the restructuring process from legal scrutiny, it could be expected that,
faced with oblivion as the alternative, hospitals would oppose the Directions
however they could, and they had the financial resources to do so. Unlike the
alternatives-persuasion, pressure or politics-judicial review was one of the few
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ways that the Commission might be forced to change its decisions C
offered the possibility of altering the distribution of power as between the ~;rts
and the hospitals. And at the outset, no one knew that courts would tak RC
. . d .
f h .
1
h
.
.
f h
e such
a llffilte view o t e1r roe, or sue an expansive vtew o t e Commissio ,
powers. Deciding to challenge the HSRC's Directions in court made sense. n s
The hospitals, though, were not able to convince the courts there we
grounds to intervene. With respect to the Wellesley Central and Pembro~e
Civic Hospitals in particular, the courts' failure to appreciate the consequenc~
of these decisions for marginalized groups, or to accurately understand the
constitutional dimension of their claims is a stark reminder of how easily these
groups are excluded from constitutional protection. The contrast with the
treatment of language and cultural rights in Lalonde is notable. The losses,
however, do not mean that nothing was achieved. Litigation can serve important
functions even when unsuccessful. In the HSRC cases, it acted as an important
focal point for community organizing in opposition to government action.
Further, the lawsuits undoubtedly made the HSRC's restructuring decisions
more public. As a result, the process itself was opened to greater public scrutiny
and assessment. The litigation also exposed the nature of the process and the
issues and decisions at stake. It became apparent that hospital restructuring
was not an apolitical issue, nor one that could be solved by applying neutral,
objective criteria to arrive at uncontested answers, the «right» solution. As this
became increasingly clear, the continued litigation intensified the political
pressure on government to acknowledge and resume its responsibility for
hospital restructuring and ensuring access to health care services.
Hospital restructuring remains a never-ending story in Ontario. Some resisted
the HSRC's Directions and seem to have met with some success through inertia
(see for example, Lukits, 2003). With the defeat of the Conservatives in the last
election in Ontario, the new Liberal government is permitting others to withdraw
from or alter the amalgamations the HSRC imposed and enter into different
alignments. (In 2005, Georgetown Hospital withdrew from the William Osler
Health Centre, where it had been one of three campuses, and joined with other
area hospitals.) Government continues efforts to rein in hospital spending and
reconfigure the organization of hospitals and the health care system through
different initiatives. The 2004 Commitment to the Future ofMedicare Act would
allow it to require accountability agreements from health care institutions and
exact financial penalties from hospital administrations and senior executives
that fall short of fiscal goals. Most recently, Ontario has introduced its version
of regionalization, Local Health Integrated Networks. As this initiative is just
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being implemented at the time of writing, it is too new to assess its impact.
Returning to a final comment on Wellesley Central and its decision to litigate,
he hospital lost; its application for judicial review was dismissed. In that, it
1
met the same fate as all the other hospitals that challenged the HSRC's decisions
io court, with the exception of Montfort. Yet by refusing to accept the
commission's Directions, the Wellesley Central also made substantial gains.
first, it established that neither the Commission nor the government could
simply require it to relinquish its property, nor to do so without appropriate
compensation. Second, rather than St. Michael's governing and operating the
Sherbourne ambulatory care centre alone, it ultimately gained its independence.
It has now become an independent entity. More importantly, the litigation
forced not only St. Michael's to negotiate with it, but brought the government
to the table as well, rather than Wellesley Central simply being left to implement
the HSRC's Directions. The result was that at the end of the day, Wellesley
Central emerged reconfigured, and having retained funds to continue its urban
health initiatives in a community and for people who had great need of such
services. Wellesley Central was not able to preserve the hospital, but it did
preserve an ability to act to further that mission.

*I am grateful for the research assistance of Brad Moscato and Alexandra Wilbee.
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